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INTRODUCTION
The business landscape of the recording industry has drastically
changed with the quick evolution of digital technology. Record labels1
fell behind the curve from the inception of music’s digitization by
failing to embrace the new ways in which music was distributed and
consumed.2 Although more consumers were using the Internet to listen
to and purchase music, for many years labels continued to rely on
revenue generated from the sales of physical records.3 This is evidenced
in the labels’ omission of digital distribution systems as a source of
revenue in artists’ contracts.4 The record companies’ failure to include
contractual provisions for digital distribution systems5 became
problematic as sales of and profits from physical albums started to
decline and digital music consumption rose.6 These tensions became
evident as the artists and labels began to disagree over royalty
1 A record label is defined as “[a] recording company, or a section of one, producing and
releasing records under a distinctive name.” Record label, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://
www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/record-label?q=record+label (last visited Feb. 8,
2016).
2 See Bobby Owsinski, How The Music Industry Created Its Own Worst Nightmares,
FORBES (Aug. 7, 2014, 11:00AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bobbyowsinski/2014/08/07/howthe-music-industry-created-its-own-worst-nightmares.
3 See Lauren K. Turner, Note, The Impact of Technology on Pre-Digital Recording
Agreements: An Examination of F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Records, 114 W. VA. L.
REV. 347, 351–54 (2011).
4 See, e.g., F.B.T. Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 562 U.S. 1286 (2011); Malmsteen v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 123
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
5 Specifically, royalty rate provisions that specified the percentage an artist would receive for
a sale of music through an online retailer.
6 See, e.g., F.B.T., 621 F.3d 958; Malmsteen, 940 F. Supp. 2d 123.
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payments.7
Royalty payments from physical album sales were historically one
of the main sources of revenue for record labels.8 Labels were
successful in negotiating low royalty payments to artists for the sale of
physical albums since album manufacturing and distribution costs were
high. Major labels sought to retain a majority of the royalties as
recoupment for their investment in the expensive physical distribution
system.9
As labels struggled to remain profitable, they persisted on limiting
royalty payments to artists. One strategy required a controversial
interpretation of recording contracts that were negotiated in the predigital era.10 Since older recording contracts failed to specifically
address royalty rates for music consumed through digital distribution
methods, record labels argued that music purchased through a third
party online retailer (e.g., Apple iTunes 11) constituted a “sale” under the
traditional royalty structure, rendering a royalty rate between thirteen to
twenty percent to artists.12 In contrast, artists contended that online sales
of albums were “licenses” and not sales, thus providing artists with the
industry norm royalty of fifty percent.13 This point of contention—the
company’s assertion that digital downloads were sales versus the artist’s
insistence that they were licenses—has led record industry participants
to turn to the courts for resolution.
Yet the courts themselves disagree about how these older contract
terms should be interpreted and applied to digital distribution methods.
In Malmsteen v. Universal Music Group, Inc.,14 the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that a digital download was
considered a record sold, providing the artist with a lower royalty rate
7
8

See infra Part I.B (overview of the royalty structure).
See Turner, supra note 3, at 351–54; Zeb G. Schorr, Note, The Future of Online Music:
Balancing the Interests of Labels, Artists, and the Public, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 67, 83
(2003).
9 Brief for The Motown Alumni Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 10–11,
F.B.T. Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-55817), 2010
WL 2751584, at *10–11.
10 Brief for The Motown Alumni Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note
9, at 10–11.
11 iTunes, APPLE https://www.apple.com/itunes (last visited Oct. 8, 2017).
12 Thirteen to twenty percent of the wholesale price is the current industry rate for royalties
on U.S. album sales. DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC
BUSINESS 93–94 (9th ed. 2015).
13 Historically, the industry rate for royalties accrued for licensed records was 50%. Id. at
144. The percentage was based on the record company’s net receipts, meaning the costs paid by
the purchaser, minus costs of duplication, shipping, etc. Id. Recently, however, labels have
created new departments within their companies, normally referred to as “special markets” or
“catalog” departments. Id. These departments are tasked with taking recordings and developing
creative ways to make money off of them. Id. To cover the costs of these departments, labels
charge a fee of fifteen to twenty–five percent of master license receipts, which is taken off the
top, before an artist’s royalty is deducted. Id. at 144–45.
14 940 F. Supp. 2d 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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(i.e., eight to fifteen percent).15 This contradicts the court’s finding in
F.B.T. Productions, L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records,16 where the Ninth
Circuit ruled that a purchase of a record through a third party online
retailer was considered a master17 licensed, rendering a higher royalty
percentage (i.e., fifty percent) to the artist for each digital download.18
One reason for the courts’ conflicting rulings is likely because of their
inconsistent interpretations of the contract terms in the parties’
recording agreements.
This Note examines the disparity in the courts’ rulings in the
Malmsteen and F.B.T. cases, specifically the different ways in which
each court interpreted the contractual language of the parties’ preInternet recording agreements, and their application of royalty rates.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the royalty structure used to
compute royalty rates for compact discs (CDs). Part I discusses on the
economic effects of switching to a digital distribution system, the sales
versus license distinction, and the principles relied on by the courts to
interpret pre-Internet contracts. Part II of this Note examines the courts’
rulings in Malmsteen and F.B.T. The Malmsteen court held that the
“Records Sold” provision determined the artist’s royalty rate for a
digital download. Contrarily, in F.B.T. the court concluded that the
royalty rate for a digital download is based on the royalty structure for
“Masters Licensed.” Part III explores the courts’ failure to acknowledge
a digital first-sale doctrine, which consequently frustrates the
justifications for classifying digital music transactions as sales. Part IV
serves as an analogy—discussing other types of agreements that are
categorized as licenses, even though they are not labeled as such. Part V
proposes reasons courts should follow the F.B.T. court’s holding and
apply the Masters Licensed provision for digital downloads.
Specifically, labeling the transactions as licenses more accurately
comports with the parties’ intention when negotiating the agreements.
I.
A.

THE PRELUDE

The Effects of Music’s Digitization

Based on the traditional business model, major labels depended
heavily on the sales accrued from distribution of physical albums and

15
16
17

See id.
621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1677 (2011).
In the music industry, there are two meanings for “master.” PASSMAN, supra note 12, at
74–75. One definition of a master is an original recording created in the studio from which copies
are made. Id. at 74. A master can also mean the recording of a particular song (e.g., one might say
an album is comprised of “ten masters”). Id. at 74–75.
18 See F.B.T., 621 F.3d 958.
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they invested in the physical distribution system accordingly.19 Labels
signed artists to expensive deals, financed the production of music, and
acquired their own distributors.20 By expanding their business to include
editing, printing, packaging, distribution, and promotion, record labels
were able to profit from the industry’s dependence on the physical
distribution system.21 Record labels controlled nearly every aspect of
distribution through their ownership and operations of manufacturing
plants and warehouses.22
This vertical integration became meaningless as music
consumption moved to a digital platform. As physical album sales
declined, manufacturing and distribution costs simultaneously decreased
as labels reduced their production of physical CDs.23 Major record
labels were discharged from the duties of manufacturing, packaging,
and storing physical albums; they were no longer required to ship
product to distribution outlets; nor did they have to bear the risk of
breakage or unsold records.24 Although their revenue decreased, labels
benefited from the reduced distribution costs since digital distribution
commanded exponentially less investment than physical distribution.25
The migration to digital distribution and consumption dramatically
changed the economics of the music business because labels no longer
bore the costs associated with physical distribution (or, at the very
minimum, these costs were drastically reduced).26 Instead, the digital
distribution system allowed record labels to license the music to third
parties, who, in turn, distributed the music to consumers.27
B.

The Royalty Scheme

Although labels have converted to a simplified royalty structure in
response to contemporary music consumption methods,28 older
19
20

See Turner, supra note 3.
See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 65, 67–68 (A distributor “sells physical copies
of . . . records to the stores and distributes . . . music digitally.” Major distributors “are gigantic
distribution networks that coordinate digital distribution and move physical records from
manufacturing plants into the stores . . . . [L]ike any other manufacturing business . . . it’s
expensive to set up and maintain the warehousing, shipping, inventory controls, sales force, etc.,
necessary to move goods into a marketplace.” There are now only three major distributors left—
Sony, Universal, and WEA.)
21 Turner, supra note 3, at 351–52, 366–67.
22 Id. at 367–68.
23 See id. at 367–68.
24 See id. at 369 (citing DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC
BUSINESS 89 (8th ed. 2013)).
25 Brief for The Motown Alumni Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note
9, at 10–11.
26 See Turner, supra note 3, at 367–68.
27 Brief for The Motown Alumni Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note
9, at 11–12.
28 See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 76–77. In typical modern recording agreements, the
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contracts were premised on a more complicated royalty computation
system.29 When an artist enters into a recording agreement with a label,
the terms generally require the artist to transfer copyright ownership of
her recordings to the record label.30 In exchange for copyright
ownership, the label agrees to pay the artist an advance and royalties
based on several income participation sources, including artist royalties,
mechanical royalties,31 synchronization fees,32 and master use fees,33
subject to the terms specified in the recording agreement. A “royalty” is
the percentage of revenue earned from the sale or other monetization of
a sound recording that the record company pays to an artist.34
Recording contracts contain royalty computation provisions that
specify the means of determining the dollar amount an artist will be
paid based on the royalty rates provided in the contract. Prior to the
industry’s 2006 update of the royalty structure, various factors were
taken into consideration to determine an artist’s royalty rate.35
Historically, an artist’s royalty percentage for the sale of a record was
calculated against the “base price.”36 The base price was the suggested
retail list price (SRLP), which was the estimated price for the sale of the
record,37 less the packaging charge.38 The deduction of the packaging
royalty rate for physical recordings is a percentage of the wholesale price, also known as the
Published Price to Dealers (PPD). Id. The royalty amount due to an artist is calculated by
multiplying the royalty percentage times the wholesale price. Id. In older contracts, artists’
royalties were a percentage of the Suggested Retail List Price (SRLP). Id. at 80–81.
29 Id. at 80–81.
30 Brief for The Motown Alumni Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note
9, at 4.
31 Section 115 of the Copyright Act of 1976 requires the payment of mechanical royalties. 17
U.S.C. § 115 (2012). Record labels are permitted to make and distribute sound recordings, so
long as they pay a royalty to the artist. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012); see also Steven T. Lowe and
Abhay Khosla, Royal Treatment: While Many Legal Remedies May Exist to Collect Unpaid
Music Royalties, Artists May Find Themselves Stymied in the Absence of a Fiduciary
Relationship, L.A. LAW. 24 (June 29, 2006). The mechanical royalty rate is fixed by the statute,
but can be negotiated by the parties. Id.
32 Synchronization fees are fees obtained when a third party secures a synchronization license
with the owner of the underlying composition to use the underlying composition in an audiovisual
work, such as a movie. See Lowe and Khosla, supra note 31, at 26.
33 A master use fee is a fee obtained when the owner of the sound recording licenses the right
to use the sound recording in an audiovisual work. Id. A master use license is usually obtained in
conjunction with a synchronization license. Id.
34 See id.
35 See PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 80–85.
36 Id. at 80–81.
37 Id. (emphasis added). The SRLP was provided by the label to the retailer. See id. at 80. See
also RICHARD SCHULENBERG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: AN INSIDER’S VIEW
OF THE LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC BUSINESS 483 (1999) (defining SRLP as
“[t]he suggested selling price to the public set by the manufacturer of the product, for example,
$15.95 for a CD”). The manufacturers were the record labels. PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 139. It
is worth nothing that the SRLP was not the price a purchaser actually paid for the compact disc.
Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
38 SCHULENBERG supra note 37, at 42. The packaging charge was the cost of the packaging,
computed by the label. PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 80. In reality, the label most likely deducted a
higher charge than the packaging actually cost. Id.
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charge from the SRLP resulted in a decrease in the artist’s royalty.39
The royalty calculation for licenses was much easier to compute
than royalties for sales of albums. Generally, an artist was entitled to
fifty percent of the label’s net receipts40 received from licensing deals
between the label and a third party.41 The divergence between the
records sold and records licensed royalty rate created a noticeable
financial difference depending on whether an artist’s record was sold or
licensed. It was important for labels and artists alike to distinguish
between the meaning of sale and license within the recording agreement
because an artist’s royalty rate compensation was dependent upon
which distinction is used.42
1.

Sales

Black’s Law Dictionary defines a sale as transferring property or
title for a price.43 There are four elements to a sale: (1) competent
parties that are able to contract; (2) mutual assent; (3) a thing capable of
transference; and (4) a price in money that is either paid or promised.44
The Uniform Commercial Code defines a sale as the passage of title
from a seller to a buyer for a specific price.45 For the purposes of this
Note, it is also necessary to understand the meaning of sale as it is used
within the music recording industry. Prior to the advent of the digital
download, the sale of a physical record in the United States had to
consist of the following criteria: (1) the record must be sold in the
United States; and (2) the sale must be (a) made at full price; (b)
through Normal Retail Channels; and (c) by normal distribution
channels.46
In the music industry, a sale made through a Normal Retail
39 Id. Labels theorized that artists should receive royalties based solely on the record, not the
packaging. Id. The packaging charge was calculated as a percentage of the SRLP. Id. The
industry norm percentage for compact discs was 25% of the SRLP. Id. A royalty computation can
be shown using simple numbers: CD retail price of $10.00 less a packaging charge (i.e., 25% of
$10.00) of $2.50, equals a base price of $7.50. Id. at 81. If an artist had a royalty rate of ten
percent, the she would receive $0.75 for every album sold. Id.
40 PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 144. As used in this sense, net receipts mean the flat fee or
royalty received by the label that is directly attributable to the use of the sound recording, less any
costs incurred by the label in connection with the exploitation, such as duplicating costs, union or
guild payments, manufacturing costs, etc. SCHULENBERG, supra note 37, at 354.
41 SCHULENBERG, supra note 37, at 354.
42 See supra Introduction.
43 Sale, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
44 Id.
45 U.C.C. § 2-106 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
46 PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 141. Today, a full price record is about $9.00–$10.00
wholesale price (PPD) for a CD. See id. A “Normal Retail Channel” typically includes sales of
records in brick-and-mortar record stores or other similar retail stores. See Rebecca J. Gremmel,
Note, New Use and the Music Licensing Agreement, 22 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 239, 246 (2000);
PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 141.
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Channel traditionally consisted of transactions in brick and mortar
record or retail stores. The disadvantage of stocking these stores with
physical records was that labels bore the high costs associated with
manufacturing, packaging, and distributing physical records.47 Music
labels contend that royalty rates for sales under the physical distribution
system should be limited to lower rates for the artist because the
company incurs the high ancillary distribution costs.48 Therefore, labels
had more bargaining power when negotiating royalties with artists for
physical record sales.49
Much of the modern music consumption occurs through online
retail stores, rather than the brick-and-mortar stores of the past.50 Since
music has become digital, consumers view online stores in the way
previously associated with physical stores—which were once the most
widely used sources for music consumption. Thus, labels argue that
online retail stores or websites that sell records should be considered
Normal Retail Channels as understood by the music industry’s standard
definition of a sale.51 Music labels assert that selling a record through
online stores comports with the elements required to qualify as a sale
because online retail stores are now equated with physical stores.52
2.

Licenses

Black’s Law Dictionary defines a license as permission to act in a
manner that would otherwise be considered unlawful.53 Copyright
licenses often possess similar elements: (1) an express limitation on the
licensee’s use of the content; (2) licensee’s sublicensing ability; (3) a
geographical or jurisdictional limitation on licensee’s rights; (4) a
specification of whether the licensee has an exclusive or nonexclusive
right to the content; (5) the term of the license (this includes licenses in
perpetuity); and (6) the licensing fee or royalty.54 Before the existence
of online distributors, labels licensed artists’ recordings for movies,
television shows, and commercials.55 These licenses cost labels

47 Brief for The Motown Alumni Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note
9, at 10–11; see supra Part I.A.
48 Brief for The Motown Alumni Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note
9, at 10–11.
49 Id.
50 See supra Part I.A.
51 See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 486 (2d
Cir. 1998).
52 Brief for The Motown Alumni Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note
9, at 10–11.
53 License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed., 2014).
54 Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions: Amazon “Kindles” the Copy Ownership
Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 147, 162 (2009–2010).
55 PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 144.
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minimal, if any, distribution costs as the labels do not have to pay the
additional costs associated with physical records.56 Therefore, artists
were able to negotiate higher royalty rates.57
Artists argue that certain transactions with online third party music
distributors should be classified as licenses, in light of the way labels
contract with online retailers for music.58 The transactions conducted
over the Internet for digital music have conflated the meaning of license
and sale, as used for music purchases. Oftentimes what consumers think
are sales of records are really licenses.59 Further, the decrease in
manufacturing and distribution costs are reasonable justifications for
why lower royalty rates for these types of transactions no longer
comport with the way music is consumed. The labels reasoning for
negotiating lower royalty rates for artists due to high manufacturing and
distribution costs are less rational in the digital age. However, contracts
that were negotiated prior to the early 2000s did not reflect the changes
in music consumption associated with the inception of the Internet.60
As noted above, the distinction between sales and licenses is
important because the royalty rate for a record sale is about ten to
twenty percent of the SRLP, and licenses are around fifty percent of the
label’s net receipts accrued from the license.61 Now that record
companies and artists are earning revenue through digital listening
platforms, such as iTunes, labels are trying to determine an adequate
structure to pay out the royalty compensation. As a business model, the
smaller the royalty rate a record label has to pay to the artist, the better
for the company; therefore, labels interpret digital downloads as records
sold, leaving artists with a lower royalty rate structure. 62
C.

Contract Interpretation

The quick progression of technology burdens the courts with the
responsibility of interpreting terms of recording agreements that were
negotiated prior to the emergence of digital age and the advent of music
downloading.63 Courts are crucial in determining which royalty
structures should be applied to certain provisions in older recording
contracts that do not make reference to digital distribution.
56 Brief for The Motown Alumni Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note
9, at 10–11.
57 Id.
58 See infra Part II.
59 See infra Part III.C.
60 Brief for The Motown Alumni Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note
9, at 13.
61 Id.
62 See Turner, supra note 3.
63 See, e.g., F.B.T. Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010);
Malmsteen v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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When trying to interpret agreements, the courts are expected to
determine the intention of the parties.64 Traditionally, when adjudicating
contract disputes regarding new technologies or uses between record
companies and recording artists, courts look for any indication of a
mutual general intent that can be applied and apportioned to the new
uses.65 This is achieved by taking a close look at the language used in
the contract, surrounding circumstances, industry custom, purpose and
subject matter of the agreement, and the conduct of the parties
involved.66 Since terms pertaining to digital distribution are absent from
older recording contracts, this analysis must be read into the agreements
by the courts.67 However, the general intent of the parties is difficult to
determine when it is applied to a new technological development that is
adopted after the license has been granted.
If a contract is unambiguous then the terms must be interpreted by
the judge as a matter of law, with the court applying the plain and
commonly accepted meaning of the language to an ambiguous term.68
Otherwise, the court must decide, as a matter of law, whether an
ambiguity exists.69 An ambiguous contract must be interpreted in light
of the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the contract was
negotiated and signed.70 An ambiguity cannot exist “unless and until the
court’s application of the pertinent rules of interpretation leaves
uncertain which of two or more possible meanings represent the true
intention of the parties.”71 When a contract is silent on a certain point,
the silence is considered ambiguous only if the matter is normally
within the scope of the contract terms.72 However, a contract is not
ambiguous merely because two or more parties disagree on its
interpretation.73 When a contract is equivocal, extrinsic evidence may
be introduced by the parties to assist in determining the subjective intent
of the parties.74
64 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1638 (West 2000); F.B.T., 621 F.3d at 963; Malmsteen, 940 F. Supp. 2d
at 130 (citing Compagnie Financiere de CIC et de L’Union Europeenne v. Merrill Lynch, 232
F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 2000)).
65 See Gremmel, supra note 46, at 246.
66 6 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 2585.10 (2016 update); see also Gremmel, supra note 46.
67 FLETCHER, supra note 66.
68 Id.
69 Id. (“While an ambiguous contractual term may create a fact issue for the jury to decide,
the question of whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide by
looking at the contract in light of the circumstances existing at the time the contract was entered
into.”).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.; see also F.B.T. Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“[p]arol evidence is properly admitted to construe a contract only when its language is
ambiguous. The decision whether to admit parol evidence involves a two-step process. First, the
court provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all credible evidence concerning the
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When interpreting contracts in order to resolve issues regarding
royalty rates, as seen in the cases of Malmsteen and F.B.T., it is crucial
for the courts to determine the meaning of sale and license, as expressed
in the contracts.75 If the contract does not explicitly define sale or
license then the court uses the tools discussed above to make a
determination on the meaning. In the F.B.T. case, the agreement did not
explicitly define sale or license, so the court addressed and resolved the
definitions accordingly.76 In Malmsteen, however, the court did not
determine the meaning of sale and license, even though these terms
were not clearly defined within the contract.77
D.

Copyright Law and the First-Sale Doctrine

Aside from principles of contract interpretation, the courts also
invoke copyright law in these cases because of the important role
copyright plays in the music industry. In 1976, Congress enacted the
Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act or Act),78 where sound
recordings were considered a protected work, and copyright owners
were provided the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute
phonorecords79 of their copyrighted work.80 However, the copyright
holder’s exclusive reproduction and distribution rights are limited by the

parties’ intentions to determine ‘ambiguity,’ i.e., whether the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’
to the interpretation urged by a party. If in light of the extrinsic evidence the court decides the
language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is then
admitted to aid in the second step—interpreting the contract.” (Citing Winet v. Price, 6 Cal. Rptr.
2d 554, 557 (1992)).
75 This is important because the royalty rate will differ depending on whether the transaction
is considered a sale or a license. See supra Part I.B.
76 See also infra Part II.B.2; see generally F.B.T., 621 F.3d 958.
77 See also infra Part II.A.2; see generally Malmsteen v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 940 F.
Supp. 2d 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
78 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)
(Copyrights protect “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7)
(2012) (dividing “works of authorship” into categories, including “musical works” and “sound
recordings”).
79 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“‘[p]honorecords’ are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known
or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term ‘phonorecords’
includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed.” The further states that a
copyrighted work is “‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy
or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.”)
80 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights . . . to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.”).
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“first-sale” doctrine.81 In some cases, when a copyright holder sues for
copyright infringement, the defendant can invoke the first-sale doctrine
as a defense to the infringement claim.82 The first-sale doctrine permits
the owner of a lawfully obtained phonorecord to sell or dispose of the
phonorecord without infringing the rights of the copyright owner.83
In Malmsteen and F.B.T., the record labels argued that digital
distribution of the artists’ music were sales not licenses.84 Since the term
sale was not defined in either contract, it would be useful for the courts
to examine whether digital distribution transactions were susceptible to
the first-sale doctrine. If they were, then it would make sense to classify
these transactions as sales. As discussed later in this Note, this is one of
the methods that the F.B.T. court used to help with its contract
interpretation analysis.
II.
A.

THE CONFLICT

Malmsteen v. Universal Music Group, Inc.85
1.

Background

In Malmsteen, plaintiff Yngwie J. Malmsteen (Malmsteen), a
professional musician and successor-in-interest to DeNovo Productions
(DeNovo) and defendant, UMG Recordings, Inc. (UMG) (previously
known as PolyGram Records, Inc. (PolyGram))86 disputed the royalty
rate that should apply to permanent downloads through digital
distributors, such as iTunes.87 PolyGram and DeNovo entered into an
agreement on November 1, 1985 (the Agreement), which was at issue in
this case.88
In the Agreement between DeNovo and PolyGram, Malmsteen
gave PolyGram the exclusive right to record “Master Recordings”89
81
82
83
84

17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
Id.
Id.
See generally Malmsteen v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 123 (S.D.N.Y.
2014); F.B.T. Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958. 963 (9th Cir. 2010).
85 Malmsteen, 940 F. Supp. 2d 123.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 126.
88 Presently, the agreement is between Malmsteen, as DeNovo’s successor-in-interest, and
UMG, as the entity formerly known as PolyGram. Id. at 126.
89 The agreement defines a “Master Recording” as “[a]ny recording of sound, whether or not
coupled with a visual image, by any method and on any substance or material, whether now or
hereafter known, intended for reproduction in the form of Phonograph Records, or otherwise,
including Audio-Visual Recordings.” Id. The agreement further states that “these Master
Recordings are “‘entirely the property of [UMG]’ and that UMG ‘and its subsidiaries, affiliates,
and licensees shall have the sole, exclusive and unlimited right . . . to manufacture
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performed by Malmsteen during the Agreement term.90 PolyGram also
had the right to reproduce and sell the Master Recordings.91 UMG was
expected to pay royalties on income derived from UMG’s exploitation
of the Master Recordings, in accordance with Article 7 of the
Agreement.92 Malmsteen asserted that UMG breached the Agreement in
three ways,93 each breach relating to the calculation of royalty payments
owed to him.94
UMG sold records in various formats including digital downloads,
which were sold through third party online retailers.95 However, at the
time the Agreement was negotiated and executed in 1985, third party
online retailers were non-existent. Accordingly, the Agreement did not
provide provisions specific to sales of records in this digital download
format. Instead, UMG unilaterally decided to pay Malmsteen royalties
for the sales of digital downloads at the same rates it paid out royalties
on the sale of “Records” and “Phonograph Records”96 through Normal
Retail Channels,97 as detailed in the Agreement.98 The royalty rates for
Records sold ranged from eight to fifteen percent, and depended on the
sale’s location, the aggregate number of albums sold, and whether an
“Album” or a “Single” was sold.99
Alternatively, a separate royalty rate of fifty percent is applied to
the sale of records through methods of distribution that were outside of
the Normal Retail Channels.100 These methods included “direct mail,

Records . . . embodying . . . the performances embodied on Master Recordings,’ and that UMG
has the “exclusive right to publicly perform and otherwise utilize [Malmsteen’s] performances in
connection with Audio-Visual Recordings for promotional and commercial purposes.” Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. (Article 7 of the agreement species royalty rates for each revenue stream associated
with the sale or license of the master recordings.).
93 Id. at 131 (stating the Defendants (1) failed to pay the proper royalty rate for sales of digital
downloads; (2) deducted improper video production costs from audio royalties; and (3) failed to
account for royalties on sales of the Far Beyond the Sun DVD).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. (citing the Agreement § 13.02: “Records” and “Phonograph Records” are defined in the
agreement as “[a]ny device now or hereafter known, on or by which sound may be recorded and
reproduced, which is manufactured or distributed primarily for home and/or consumer and/or juke
box use and/or use on or in means of transportation including ‘sight and sound’ devices or AudioVisual Devices.”).
97 Id. (citing the Agreement § 13.16: A “Normal Retail Channel” is defined in the agreement
as “[n]ormal retail distribution channels” with certain exclusions that are provided in the
agreement.)
98 Id. at 127 (defining “Records” and “Phonograph Records” as “[a]ny device now or
hereafter known, on or by which sound may be recorded and reproduced, which is manufactured
or distributed primarily for home and/or consumer and/or juke box use and/or use on or in means
of transportation including “sight and sound” devices or Audio–Visual Devices; defining
“Normal Retail Channels” as “[n]ormal retail distribution channels, excluding sales of Records
described in [§§ 7.05–7.08], herein.”).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 128.
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mail order, or in conjunction with TV advertising, including through
methods of distribution such as ‘key outlet marketing’ (distribution
through retail fulfillment centers in conjunction with special
advertisements on radio or television), or by any combination of the
methods set forth above or other methods.”101 Malmsteen asserted that
royalties for the sales of digital downloads were governed by the
provision as applied to third party licenses, rather than the provision
regarding sales through Normal Retail Channels.102
2.

Court’s Analysis

The parties disagreed on which royalty rate to apply to the sale of
digital downloads, yet both parties contended that the contract was
unambiguous, and that the issue could be resolved on the face of the
contract, without relying on extrinsic evidence.103 Accordingly, the
court had to resolve the question as a matter of law.104 First the court
concluded that digital downloads constituted Records under the
Agreement because the language in the Records provision stated that
Records were, inter alia, “[a]ny device now or hereafter known” on
which sound was recorded and reproduced.105 The court identified this
language as a clear intent by the parties to include future technologies as
Records.106
Next, the court addressed the question of whether the downloads
are considered Records sold through Normal Retail Channels, or
whether they were a specified distribution enumerated in § 7.06(a)(ii) of
the agreement.107 The court determined that, in modern times, the
101 Id. (citing Agreement § 7.06, which provides Malmsteen a royalty rate of 50% for Records
sold by specific methods, including: “licenses of Master Recordings to Non–Affiliated Third
Parties for sales of Records by such licenses through direct mail, mail order, or in conjunction
with TV advertising, including through methods of distribution such as ‘key outlet marketing’
(distribution through retail fulfillment centers in conjunction with special advertisements on radio
or television), or by any combination of the methods set forth above or other methods.”).
102 Id. at 127.
103 Id. at 131.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 131–32 (“digital downloads are clearly Records, as defined in § 13.02 of the
Agreement . . . . The phrase ‘[a]ny device now or hereafter known on or by which sound may be
recorded and reproduced’ manifests the clear intent of the contracting parties that the definition of
Record encompass as-yet-undeveloped technologies” (citing Reinhardt v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc.,
547 F. Supp. 2d 346, 354–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2008))). In Reinhardt, the court ruled that the “phrase
‘now or hereafter known,’ when referring to forms of reproduction, reveals that future
technologies are covered by the agreement . . . . It is not reasonable to construe the phrase ‘all
forms’ ‘now or hereafter known’ to exclude Defendants’ alleged digital download form.”
Reinhardt, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 354–55. See also Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d
166, 172 (N.Y. 2002); Silvester v. Time Warner, Inc., 763 N.Y.S.2d 912, 917 (Sup. Ct. 2003),
aff’d, 787 N.Y.S.2d 870 (App. Div. 2005)).
106 Malmsteen, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 131.
107 Id. at 132.
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phrase Normal Retail Channels included digital downloads sold through
the iTunes store and similar online distribution retailers.108 As brick and
mortar record stores no longer existed, iTunes had comfortably taken
their place and performed essentially the same function of selling music
to consumers.109 Accordingly, the royalty rate of eight to fifteen percent
should be applied to these sales, rather than the fifty percent royalty rate
that would be applied if the court found that digital downloads were
licenses between UMG and third party retailers.110 The court reasoned
that the term Records was defined broadly enough in the Agreement to
include digital downloads sold through Normal Retail Channels and
were thus, unambiguously governed by the applicable royalty rates.111
The court further stated that Malmsteen’s interpretation of the
Agreement did not corroborate the intent of the parties because the sale
of digital downloads did not resemble the methods expressed in
§ 7.06(a)(ii) of the Agreement.
Contrarily, Malmsteen argued that digital downloads fell into the
residual clause following the list: “or by any combination of the
methods set forth above or other methods.”112 However, the court
countered Malmsteen’s contention by turning to two basic principles of
contractual interpretation: (1) ejusdem generis and (2) the reluctance by
court to interpret contracts in a way to render certain provisions
superfluous.113 The first principal that the court examined was ejusdem
generis, which states that when a phrase such as “or other methods”
follows a list of specific terms, the court is required to interpret the
phrase to refer to items that are similar to the others specifically
listed.114 The court reasoned that digital distribution was unlike the
distribution means that were specified in § 7.06(a)(ii).115
The court also relied on the general principal that interpretations
that create redundancy and render the contract provisions superfluous
are disfavored.116 Malmsteen conceded that his interpretation of the
clause “or other methods” was nearly limitless.117 Therefore, if new
methods were to be construed under Malmsteen’s interpretation, then

108
109

Id.
Id. (citing Allman v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, No. 06 Civ. 3252(GBD), 2008 WL
2477465, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008), judgment vacated with leave to amend pleadings, No.
06 Civ. 3252 (Dkt. 37)).
110 Malmsteen, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
111 Id.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
113 Id. at 133.
114 Id. (citing Travelers’ Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Seaver, 86 U.S. 531 (1873); Haynes v.
Kleinewefers & Lembo Corp., 921 F.2d 453, 457 (2d Cir. 1990); Purchase Partners, L.L.C. v.
Carver Fed. Sav. Bank, 914 F. Supp. 2d 480, 491–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 594 (9th ed. 2009))).
115 Malmsteen, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 132.
116 Id. at 133.
117 Id. at 132.
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they did not have to resemble the preceding distribution methods listed.
If the court were to interpret the phrase according to Malmsteen’s
assertion, then the enumerated list in that section and in §7.06(i) would
be rendered unnecessary.118
The court ultimately decided that UMG’s interpretation of the
contract was correct because § 7.06(a)(ii) could reasonably be
interpreted to encompass the sales of digital downloads, especially
considering the similarities between brick-and-mortar music retail stores
and iTunes.119 Accordingly, the royalty rates of eight to fifteen percent,
as expressed in §§ 7.01–7.02 of the Agreement, controlled these
sales.120
B.

F.B.T. Productions, L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records121
1.

Background

The parties in this case, plaintiffs F.B.T. Productions, L.L.C. and
Em2M, L.L.C., (collectively F.B.T.), disputed the percentage of
royalties due under their contract with defendant Aftermath Records
(Aftermath), in connection with the recordings of their artist Marshal B.
Mathers, III, professionally known as Eminem.122 F.B.T. acquired the
exclusive rights to Eminem’s recordings through an exclusive recording
contract executed in 1995.123 In 1998, F.B.T. transferred its rights to
Aftermath in exchange for royalty payments.124 The agreement between
F.B.T. and Aftermath included two royalty provisions, a Records Sold
provision125 and a Masters Licensed provision.126 The Records Sold
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

Id.
Id.
See id.
F.B.T. Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 961
Id.
Id.
F.B.T. Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, No. CV 07-3314 PSG (MANx), 2009 WL
137021, at *1 (CD. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009), rev’d, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010) (Records are defined
as “all forms of reproductions, whether embodying sound alone or sound together with visual
images, manufactured or distributed primarily for home use.”); F.B.T., 621 F.3d at 961 (stating
“[t]he ‘Records Sold’ provision of that agreement provides that F.B.T. is to receive between 12%
and 20% of the adjusted retail price of all ‘full price records sold in the United States . . . through
normal retail channels . . . . The agreement does not contain a definition of . . . ‘normal retail
channels.’”).
126 F.B.T., 2009 WL 137021, at *1 (A ‘master’ is defined as ‘a recording of a sound, without
or with visual images, which is used or useful in the recording, production or manufacture of
records.’”); F.B.T., 621 F.3d at 961 (citing that the “Masters Licensed” provision “provides that
‘[n]otwithstanding the foregoing,’ F.B.T. is to receive 50% of Aftermath’s net receipts ‘[o]n
masters licensed by us . . . to others for their manufacture and sale of records or for any other
uses.’ The contract defines ‘master’ as a recording of a sound, without or with visual images,
which is used or useful in the recording, production or manufacture of records.’ The agreement
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provision set a royalty rate in the range of twelve to twenty percent for
records sold at full-price in the United States.” Alternatively, the
Masters Licensed section stated that F.B.T. was entitled to fifty percent
of the net receipts the label received for masters licensed to third parties
for sale or “any other uses of the masters.”127
In 2003, F.B.T. and Aftermath entered into a new agreement,
which terminated the original agreement and increased various royalty
rates, but maintained the provisions in the 1998 agreement regarding
Records Sold and Masters Licensed.128 In 2004, the parties amended the
2003 agreement to state that a sale of a permanently downloaded album
will be treated as though it were a sale made through a Normal Retail
Channel for purposes of royalty escalations.129 This amendment was
important to Aftermath’s argument because it linked permanent
downloads, album sales, Normal Retail Channels, and royalty rates.
F.B.T. commenced this suit after an audit showed that Aftermath
had applied the Records Sold provision (i.e., twelve and twenty percent
rate) to calculate royalties for the sales received from these digital retail
stores through permanent downloads.130
The nature of the parties’ dispute originated from their
disagreement over whether the royalty rate for sales of Eminem’s
records in the form of permanent downloads through third party online
retailers constituted Records Sold or Masters Licensed under the
contract provisions.131 Prior to trial, F.B.T. moved for summary
judgment, on the grounds that the Masters Licensed provision was
unambiguous and applicable to permanent downloads.132 Aftermath
cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing that the 2004 amendment
was evidence that the parties intended the Records Sold provision to be
applied to permanent downloads.133 Both motions were denied by the
district court, as the court concluded that the agreement language was
susceptible to either interpretation.134 In its appeal, F.B.T. reasserted
that the Masters Licensed provision unambiguously applied to the sale
of permanent downloads through online third party retailers.135

does not contain a definition of . . . ‘licensed[.]’”).
127 F.B.T., 621 F.3d at 964.
128 Id. at 962.
129 Id. (The term “escalations” as used in the agreement means “increases in the royalty rate
when total album sales surpass certain targets.” For example, an agreement might give an artist a
one percent increase in her royalty rate if the album sells more than 500,000 units.). This
amendment can be interpreted to show that the label was equating an online retail store to a brickand-mortar record store.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 961–62.
132 Id. at 961.
133 Id. at 962.
134 F.B.T., 621 F.3d at 961.
135 Id.
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Court’s Analysis

The Ninth Circuit was tasked with answering the question of
whether the recordings downloaded through digital retail stores
constituted Masters Licensed or Records Sold.136 The district court
denied F.B.T.’s motion for summary judgment, based on the fact that
the contract language was ambiguous, and subject to either
interpretation.137 The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the lower court’s
determination on the grounds that the Masters Licensed provision was
unambiguous as applied to the contract between the parties.138
As required by California Civil Code § 1638,139 the court examined
the language in the agreement as contracted by the parties. As discussed
above, the Records Sold provision specifies the royalty rate for Records
sold in the United States at full price and through Normal Retail
Channels.140 Here, Aftermath argued that the Records Sold provision
controlled because permanent downloads should be considered Records,
and iTunes and other digital music distribution retailers should be
considered Normal Retail Channels.141
To determine whether Aftermath’s assertion was correct, the court
carefully examined the use of the word “notwithstanding,” which was
used in the Masters Licensed provision, following the Records Sold
provision.142 Specifically, the agreement stated that “[n]otwithstanding”
the Records Sold provision, F.B.T. is entitled to fifty percent of
Aftermath’s net receipts on “masters licensed by [Aftermath] . . . to
others for their manufacture and sale of records of for any other
uses.”143 The court concluded that the parties’ use of “notwithstanding”
indicated that a transaction could be considered a Record Sold, while
simultaneously being a Master License, if Aftermath licensed an
Eminem master recording to a third party for “any other uses.”144 The
court explained that the broadness of a term does not make it
ambiguous, and stated that, “the Masters Licensed provision explicitly
applies to (1) masters (2) that are licensed to third parties for the
manufacture of records ‘or for any other uses,’ (3) ‘notwithstanding’ the
Record Sold provision.”145
136
137

Id.
F.B.T. Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, No. CV 07-3314 PSG (MANx), 2009 WL
137021, at *7 (CD. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009).
138 F.B.T., 621 F.3d at 967.
139 Id. at 963 (“The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is
clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.”).
140 Id. at 964.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 961.
144 Id.
145 Id.
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To determine whether the Masters Licensed provision could apply
in this context, the court first had to decide whether Aftermath’s
agreement with Apple was a third party license of Eminem’s master.146
To reach its conclusion, the court relied on California Civil Code
§ 1644.147 When looking at the ordinary meaning of the word license,
the dictionary defines it as “permission to act.”148 There was no dispute
by Aftermath that the agreement it entered into with iTunes permitted
iTunes to use the master recordings to produce and sell permanent
downloads.149 Accordingly, the court ruled that the agreement between
Aftermath and Apple qualified as a license.150
The court also looked to general principles of federal copyright law
to ensure the court’s ruling comported with the law—specifically the
court looked at the meanings of license and sale as found in the
Copyright Act.151 Under the Copyright Act and decisions of the
Supreme Court, the sale of a work can “either be a transfer in title of an
individual copy of a work, or a sale of all exclusive intellectual property
rights in a work.”152 At no point did Aftermath relinquish its ownership
rights to Eminem’s recordings in its agreements with Apple and other
third parties.153 According to the court, nothing had been “sold” to the
online retailers as these distributors never acquired title to the digital
files.154
Although the first-sale doctrine155 provides a definition for a sale,
the court turned elsewhere in the Copyright Act for the meaning of
license. Section 114(f) provides a statutory authorization, defined as a
license, for the exercise of public performance rights that would
otherwise be reserved as exclusive rights of the copyright holder.156
Section 115 provides a statutory authorization, again defined as a
license, for artists to make and distribute phonorecord “covers,” a right

146
147

Id.
Id. (“The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense,
rather than according to their strict legal meaning; unless used by the parties in a technical
sense . . . .”).
148 Id. (citing License, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2002)).
149 F.B.T., 621 F.3d at 964.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 965 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 109 (describing the “first sale” doctrine); Quality King
Distribs. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 145 (1998) (describing the transfer of an
individual copy of a work as a sale); see also 3-10 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.02 (2017) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (describing a
transfer of all ownership in a copyright as a sale)).
153 See F.B.T., 621 F.3d at 965–66.
154 Id. at 965.
155 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of
the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”).
156 17 U.S.C. § 114(f). The court also cites to 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(a), 114(d)(2).
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that would otherwise be reserved for the copyright holder.157
The court also turned to cases that addressed the Copyright Act.
The court stated that “it is well settled that where a copyright owner
transfers a copy of copyrighted material, retains title, limits the uses to
which the material may be put, and is compensated periodically based
on the transferee’s exploitation of the material, the transaction is a
license.”158 The court determined that federal copyright law provided
support for its conclusion that the agreements entered into with Apple
iTunes and similar online retail distributors were licenses to distribute
Eminem’s master recordings through permanent downloads, without
transferring Aftermath’s title to the copyrights of the recordings.159
The court addressed Aftermath’s contention that the 2004
amendment evidenced the parties’ intention to apply permanent
downloads to the royalty structure of the Records Sold provision. The
court responded by stating that the amendment clarified that the
Records Sold provision was meant to be applied to permanent
downloads only for royalty escalation purposes.160 Looking at the plain
language of the agreement, the court concluded that the amendment was
meant to provide royalty escalation rates for sales of downloads, not the
base royalty rate for the sales of downloads.161
The Ninth Circuit ruled to reverse the decision of the district court
on the grounds that the agreements between F.B.T. and Aftermath were
unambiguous.162 The agreements clearly stated that, “notwithstanding”
the Records Sold provision, a fifty percent royalty rate was owed to
F.B.T., under the Masters Licensed provision, for all masters licensed to
third party online music distributors for “any” use. Aftermath had
undisputedly given its express permission to third parties to produce and
sell permanent downloads of Eminem’s master recordings.

157
158

17 U.S.C. § 115.
F.B.T., 621 F.3d at 965 (citing Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447
F.3d 769, 785 (9th Cir. 2006); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.
1993); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 1977); Hampton v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1960)).
159 F.B.T., 621 F.3d at 965 (The court stated that federal copyright law considered a license to
be “an authorization by the copyright owner to enable another party to engage in behavior that
would otherwise be the exclusive right of the copyright owner, but without transferring title in
those rights.”).
160 Id. at 966; see also PASSMAN, supra note 12, at 90 (“It’s common to escalate royalties
based on sales. Typical escalations are .5% to 1% at some level between 500,000 and 1 million
album sales, and another .5% to 1% at 500,000 to 1 million albums beyond that point.”).
161 F.B.T., 621 F.3d at 966.
162 Id. at 967.
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RECORD LABELS DO NOT WANT DIGITAL MUSIC
DISTRIBUTION TO BE CONSIDERED SALES

A.

The Copyright Act and the First-Sale Doctrine

[2017

The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.”163 A sound recording164 is considered “fixed” in a tangible
medium of expression when the author has embodied the work in a
phonorecord165 that is sufficiently permanent to be reproduced, inter
alia, for a more than a temporary duration.166 Although the Copyright
Act does not define “material objects,” a Massachusetts federal district
court and other authorities have held that electronic files are included in
this category.167
The Copyright Act grants an exclusive reproduction right of the
protected work to the copyright holder.168 This gives the copyright
owner the right to reproduce her sound recordings in a phonorecord.
Although “reproduction” is not defined in the Copyright Act,169 it is
inferred that a reproduction occurs when the copyrighted work is fixed
163 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). “Musical works” and “sound recordings” are categories
included as “works of authorship.” Id.
164 The Copyright Act defines sound recordings as “works that result from the fixation of a
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds . . . regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
165 The Copyright Act defines “phonorecords” as “material objects in which sounds . . . are
fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”
17 U.S.C. § 101.
166 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its
embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration.”).
167 London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 171 (D. Mass. 2008) (stating
that, “[t]he Copyright Act . . . does not use materiality in its most obvious sense . . . . Rather, it
refers to materiality as a medium in which a copyrighted work can be ‘fixed’ . . . . Thus, any
object in which a sound recording can be fixed is a ‘material object.’ That includes the electronic
files . . . . The electronic file (or, perhaps more accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard
disk) is therefore a ‘phonorecord’ within the meaning of the statute.” (citations omitted)); see also
Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that “the
definition of ‘copies’ is intended to expand the ‘fixation’ requirement to include material objects
that embody works capable of being perceived with the aid of a machine, thereby ensuring that
reproductions of copyrighted works contained on media such as floppy disks, hard drives, and
magnetic tapes would meet the Copyright Act’s ‘fixation’ requirement.”); 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY,
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:93 (2017) [hereinafter PATRY ON COPYRIGHT] (“Fixation now may be
in ‘any tangible medium of expression,’ including tapes, LPs, compact discs, and MP3 files.”
(footnote omitted)).
168 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
169 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 167 § 9:63.
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in a material object, including phonorecords.170 The copyright holder’s
reproduction right is infringed when the protected work is embodied in
a phonorecord without permission.171 Many courts have held that
downloads of digital files infringe the reproduction right.172
Copyright holders are also provided an exclusive distribution right.
The Act does not define “distribution” but it is contended that
distribution is a self-defining term because the statute enumerates the
types of distribution covered.173 Accordingly, “distribution” is
seemingly defined as the sale or transfer of the copyrighted work.174
Courts have held that sharing of digital files over the Internet constitutes
infringement of a copyright owner’s distribution right.175 Accordingly,
downloading and sharing digital files are considered violations of the
reproduction and distribution rights, respectively.
The copyright holder’s reproduction and distribution rights are
limited by the first-sale doctrine, which provides a defense to a
copyright holder’s claim of infringement of her exclusive distribution
right. The first-sale doctrine permits the owner of a lawfully obtained
phonorecord to sell or dispose of the phonorecord without infringing the
rights of the copyright owner.176 This distinction can be explained by
examining the ownership of a CD: the purchaser owns the copy of the
CD, although the copyright holder owns the protected sound recordings
on the CD.177

170 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 152 § 8.02[A]; see also David Hamilton, It’s My
Copy and I’ll Sell it if I Want To: Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 232, 237–38 (2015).
171 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 152 § 8.02[B][1] (footnote omitted).
172 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Napster uses
who download files containing copyrighted music violate plaintiffs’ reproduction rights.”);
Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[W]hen a
user downloads a digital music file or ‘digital sequence’ to his ‘hard disk,’ the file is
‘reproduce[d]’ on a new phonorecord within the meaning of the Copyright Act.”); Capitol
Records, L.L.C. v. BlueBeat, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1202–03 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that
the exclusive reproduction right had been infringed due to a website’s downloads and streaming
transmissions of sound recordings).
173 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (“[T]o distribute . . . by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending[.]”); Hamilton, supra note 170 at 236.
174 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
175 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014 (Napster users who upload file names to the search index for
others to copy violate plaintiffs’ distribution rights); ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 651 (holding that,
absent an affirmative defense, the sale of digital files on Defendant’s website constituted
infringement of the copyright holder’s exclusive distribution right). Cf. New York Times Co. v.
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001) (holding that the sale of electronic copies of newspaper articles
was a violation of the copyright owner’s distribution right).
176 17 U.S.C. 109(a).
177 Cf. Krause v. Titleserve, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he author of a book,
or her assignee, ordinarily owns the copyright in the book and thus the sole right to authorize
copying; each purchaser of a copy of the book owns that copy, but is generally not entitled to
make copies from it.”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 152 § 2.03[C] (“As used in the
Copyright Act, a ‘literary work’ is a work of authorship, but a ‘book’ is not. A ‘book’ is merely a
material object that may embody, and hence constitute, a copy of a given literary work.”).
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Digital First-Sale Doctrine

In 2001, the U.S. Copyright Office released a report that stated that
§ 109 of the Copyright Act does not apply to digital transmissions of
protected works.178 The Copyright Office reasoned that digital
transmissions result in a new person possessing a new copy of the
protected work, and without human or technological intervention, the
original owner retains the source copy.179 Accordingly, the Copyright
Office recommended that the Copyright Act should not be amended to
include a digital first-sale.180
Additionally, David Nimmer agrees that a digital first-sale doctrine
is not practicable.181 According to Nimmer, the first-sale defense is
comprised of four factors: (a) a lawful copy that was produced with the
copyright owner’s authority; (b) the particular copy was transferred with
the copyright holder’s permission; (c) the defendant qualifies as the
lawful owner of that copy; and (d) the defendant simply distributed that
particular copy.182 Nimmer reasoned that transferring a digital copy to
another person breaches the “particular copy” element because the
transmitted file must be reassembled while passing through cyberspace.
Thus there is no longer a particular copy, rather there are two copies: (1)
the copy on the original owner’s hard drive and (2) the reassembled bits
that are travelling to the other person’s computer.
B.

Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc.183

About three weeks prior to its ruling in Malmsteen, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the firstsale doctrine did not apply to digital transfers of music files.184 In
Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc., the court considered whether the
first-sale doctrine permitted the owner of a lawfully purchased digital
file to resell it through the ReDigi website.185
ReDigi was a website that allowed its users to sell digital music
files that had been legally acquired.186 The user would upload her

178 DMCA Section 104 Report, 79–80, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (2001), http://
www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf
179 Id. at 79.
180 Id. at 96.
181 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT supra note 152 § 8.13[A].
182 Id.
183 Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 648. ReDigi argued that the resale of lawfully purchased digital music files on its
service was protected by the first-sale doctrine. Id. at 655. The court disagreed and determined
that the owner of the digital file could not resell it on the ReDigi website. Id. at 648.
186 Id. at 645.
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eligible files from her computer to the “Cloud Locker.”187 Once a digital
music file had been uploaded to the Cloud Locker, ReDigi’s “Media
Manager”—which the user must download in order to use the service—
automatically deleted the file from the user’s computer and connected
devices.188 The court held that the sale of a digital file on the ReDigi
website constituted an infringement of the copyright holder’s exclusive
right of reproduction and distribution,189 thereby precluding ReDigi
from asserting the first-sale defense.190
1.

The Reproduction and Distribution Rights

To determine the legality of resold music on ReDigi’s website, the
court first examined whether Capitol’s reproduction right had been
infringed.191 Judge Richard Sullivan reasoned that the embodiment of
sound recordings on a phonorecord is distinguishable from the sound
recording.192 The sound recording is the copyrightable subject matter,
whereas the phonorecord is the material object on which the sound
recordings are fixed.193 Accordingly, the sound recording is the digital
music file, and the phonorecord is the specific segment of the hard drive
where the file is fixed.194 ReDigi’s system infringed the copyright
holder’s reproduction right because downloading a digital music file to
another user’s hard drive caused the sound recording (i.e., the digital
file) to be embodied on a new phonorecord (i.e., a new hard drive).195
187
188
189
190
191

Id.
Id. at 645–46.
Id. at 651
Id. at 655.
As previously discussed, § 106(1) of the Copyright Act gives the owner of a copyright an
exclusive reproduction right. The court noted that this was a case of first impression, where the
court must address whether a duplication of digital music files over the Internet—where only one
file remained after the transfer—constitutes an infringement of a copyright owner’s exclusive
reproduction right. ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 648. Courts had previously held that unauthorized
transfers of digital music files over the Internet, where two files remained after the transfer,
constituted an infringement of the reproduction right under the Copyright Act. See, e.g., A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001).
192 ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 649 (citing London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 173 (D. Mass.
2008) (“It is simply impossible that the same ‘material object’ can be transferred over the
Internet. . . . [t]he Internet transfer of a file results in a material object being ‘created elsewhere at
its finish.”)). To come to this conclusion, the court examines London-Sire, which states,
[w]hen a user on a [P2P] network downloads a song from another user, he receives into
his computer a digital sequence representing the sound recording. That sequence is
magnetically encoded on a segment of his hard disk (or likewise written on other
media). With the right hardware and software, the downloader can use the magnetic
sequence to reproduce the sound recording. The electronic file (or, perhaps more
accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard disk) is therefore a “phonorecord”
within the meaning of the statute.
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The court also determined that a digital file transfer is protected
under the copyright owner’s distribution right.196 The court followed
previous courts’ rulings that electronic file transfers constitute
distribution of phonorecords within the meaning of the Copyright
Act.197 As there was no dispute that ReDigi distributed digital sound
recordings on its website, Judge Sullivan found that ReDigi had violated
the copyright owner’s exclusive distribution right.198
2.

The First-Sale Defense

The court ruled that the first-sale doctrine could not be asserted by
ReDigi to protect its distribution of the protected work.199 The
Copyright Act only allows distribution of a particular copy, but the
users of ReDigi’s services were not transferring their particular copy,
rather they were producing a new phonorecord on ReDigi’s servers.200
The court concluded that, since the users were not selling their
“particular” phonorecord, ReDigi could not use the first-sale doctrine as
a defense.201
If a transaction that is categorized as a sale ordinarily allows the
subsequent owner to invoke the first-sale doctrine, then it would follow
that digital sales would be able to use the first-sale doctrine as a
defense. If digital transactions cannot invoke the first-sale defense, then
they begin to resemble a license, as opposed to a sale.
C.

“Terms and Conditions” Are Licenses

Since the term license was not defined in F.B.T., the court applied
its ordinary meaning, which is “permission to act.”202 The court
explained that Aftermath’s agreement with iTunes gave iTunes
permission to use its sound recordings to sell permanent downloads.203
Although the word “sell” is used to describe the transaction between
iTunes and its subscribers, an examination of Apple’s iTunes Store

London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 166, n.16.
196 ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 651 (citing London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 173–74); see also
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. Cf. New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001)
(holding that an online news database infringed upon the copyright holder’s distribution rights by
selling digital copies of the author’s articles for download).
197 ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 651 (citing Arista Records, L.L.C. v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d
961, 968 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (collecting cases)).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 655.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 F.B.T. Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 964 (9th Cir. 2010).
203 Id.
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Terms and Conditions shows that a user’s music transactions are, in
fact, licenses, not sales—further strengthening the court’s reasoning in
the F.B.T. case.
Apple’s Terms and Conditions state that “Apple is the provider of
the iTunes Service, which permits you to access, purchase or rent digital
content.”204 Apple’s use of the word access indicates that users may not
own various purchases they make on iTunes. The agreement further
states, “[w]hen you first acquire music, purchased (i.e., not rented)
movie, TV show and music video iTunes Products . . . you may elect to
automatically receive . . . copies of such [content] on additional
compatible iOS devices.”205 Noticeably, the agreement does not list
music as a purchased product, rather it has merely been acquired by the
user. According to the Usage Rules, the user is only authorized to use
the products for personal and noncommercial use.206 On the other hand,
the Usage Rules allow iTunes Plus Products207 to be copied, stored or
burned “as reasonably necessary for personal, noncommercial use.”208
Apple “reserve[s] the right to change, suspend, remove, or disable
access to any iTunes Products, content, or other materials comprising a
part of the iTunes Service at any time without notice.”209 Apple also
reserves the right to discontinue its service.210 Should Apple choose to
do so, users may be unable to use or access the iTunes products they
purchased, and in such case, Apple disclaims its liability.211 This
constricting language found in the Terms and Conditions are licenses,
especially when compared with the dictionary definition of license.212
In F.B.T. as the court considered whether Eminem’s masters were
licensed to third parties, Aftermath argued that there was no evidence
that it used the term license in the technical sense, rather license should
be defined by its ordinary meaning—permission to act.213 The court
conjectured that, since Aftermath entered into agreements that permitted
iTunes to produce and sell permanent downloads, the agreements were

204 APPLE, Terms and Conditions (Oct. 21, 2015), http://web.archive.org.web/
20151025153214/http://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/itunes/us/terms.html.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Music downloaded from the iTunes Store is considered an iTunes Plus Product and is no
longer protected by security technology that limits its usage. About iTunes Plus, Apple (July 10,
2015), https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201616.
208 Although this grant is arguably the right to “reproduce” within the meaning of the
Copyright Act, Apple makes sure to limit this usage right by stating, “[a]ny burning or exporting
capabilities are solely an accommodation to you and shall not constitute a grant, waiver, or other
limitation of any rights of the copyright owners in any content embodied in any iTunes Product.”
Terms and Conditions, supra note 204.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed, 2014); see also supra Part I.B.2.
213 F.B.T. Prods., L.L.C. v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 964 (9th Cir. 2010).
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licenses.214 Looking upstream, if online distributors, such as iTunes, are
licensing the creative works to their users, and iTunes and the records
labels are entering into license agreements, it must be asked, At what
point are the works being sold in the digital distribution model?
IV.

THE RECONCILIATION

When deciding the treatment of digital music downloads in the
context of the royalty system, courts should consider the definitions of
Record sold and Master License and their implications. Although the
digital music download characterization will affect royalty rates, it will
also have an effect on the copyright system. Copyright law attempts to
balance the interests between the copyright holder and the user of a
copyrighted work.215 Arguably, a Record sold interpretation will
unfairly favor copyright owners because not only will copyright holders
benefit by paying lower royalties to artists, but they will also have full
downstream control of the music. If a digital download is considered a
Record sold then it would follow that the purchaser of a digital
download possesses all the rights granted to her under the Copyright
Act.
A.

Purchasers of Digital Music Files Are Licensees

The purpose of the first-sale doctrine is to limit a copyright
owner’s exclusive statutory right to control the item’s distribution once
the item is put into the stream of commerce by the copyright owner.216
Many of the arguments against categorizing digital music downloads as
licenses are rooted in the fear that licenses give copyright holders too
much control of the protected work.217 In reality, without the ability to
assert the first-sale defense, copyright holders essentially retain control
of the digital music file anyways. If the first-sale doctrine does not
apply to digital downloads, then purchasers of digital music are
fundamentally considered licensees of their digital music catalog.
As evidenced by the ReDigi case, selling music through an online
retailer is not truly a sale in the ordinary meaning of the word, because
the rights a subsequent owner would normally gain from a sale, such as
214
215

Id.
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (“[T]he [Copyright] Act creates a balance
between the artist’s right to control the work . . . and the public’s need for access to creative
works. The copyright term is limited so that the public will not be permanently deprived of the
fruits of an artist’s labor.”); see also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Brian Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy Ownership:
First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887, 1891 (2010).
216 Quality King Distribs. v. L’anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998).
217 See Carver, supra note 215, at 1891.
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the right to resell the work, are voided.218 Accordingly, these online
sales are actually licenses—which is a beneficial categorization for the
record labels because they retain control over the work. The labels’
intent when negotiating the artist contracts is to maintain as much
control of the artist’s sound recordings, which is confirmed by the
record label’s requirement that the artist assign the copyright to the
sound recording to the label.219 Thus, when courts are looking at the
intent of the parties in negotiating the recording contract, the courts
should consider that the label’s intent in retaining control of the
copyright accords with categorizing digital downloads as licenses.
In the courts’ quest to interpret the pre-Internet recording contracts,
they aim to give meaning to contact terms in a way that comports with
the parties’ intent.220 Considering the copyright holders’—the labels—
endeavor to retain their rights and power over sound recordings, and
their subsequent agreements with online music distributors, it is likely
that record labels would have intended digital distribution to be
considered a license. As evidenced in cases such as ReDigi, record
labels prefer online transactions to resemble licenses because it allows
them to retain control the exclusive rights to the work.221 Artists agree
with this interpretation because licenses give them a higher royalty rate
at fifty percent. Thus, there is a strong argument that the parties intend
digital distribution to be considered a license under the existing
agreements.
B.

The Ninth Circuit Got It Right

The Ninth Circuit has maintained relatively consistent in the
license versus sale debate. One week after its ruling in F.B.T., the court
held that the purchaser of computer software was a licensee rather than
an owner, and thus, could not invoke the first-sale doctrine.222 The court
relied on a test, similar to the one used in F.B.T., to determine whether
the agreement between the parties was a license: (1) whether the parties
classified the agreement as a license, and (2) whether the copyright
holder retained title of the copy or disallowed its duplication, inter
alia.223
Conversely, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York has, on one hand, ruled that a sale has occurred when
consumers purchase music through iTunes, or similar online retailer.224
218
219
220
221
222
223
224

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part III.A and B
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1109.
See Malmsteen v. Universal Music Grp., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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Yet, the same court has ruled that the first-sale doctrine does not apply
to digital downloads.225 Consequently, although the purchase is deemed
a sale for an artist’s royalty purposes, the sale is not privy to the firstsale doctrine and the purchaser cannot legally resell her digital music in
the same way that she would be able to sell physical CDs.
Characteristically, this provides record labels with two bites of the
apple, because they dole out minimal royalty rates to the artists while
benefitting from the absence of a secondary market for digital music.
Such consequences need to be considered when the courts are choosing
between the license versus sale distinction.
The Ninth Circuit performed a thorough interpretation of the
parties’ unambiguous recording contract.226 Unlike the New York court,
the Ninth Circuit focused on providing an analysis of the meaning of the
terms sale and license as used in the recording agreements. These two
terms are crucial in determining royalty rates because the rates are
directly related to whether the distribution method is classified as a sale
or license. The New York district court focused its attention on the
meaning of Records and Normal Retail Channels,227 and although these
terms are important, the analysis is incomplete without a discussion of
the terms sale and license. As courts begin to analyze the meaning of
sale within the digital distribution system, they will encounter the
dualism between the first-sale doctrine and the court and government’s
refusal to extend the doctrine to digital content. When addressing the
term license within the digital distribution model, a court should take
into consideration the ordinary meaning of license in this industry
practice. Specifically, the way license is used in agreements between
consumers and the online retail store; the online retail store and the
record label; and, finally, the record label and the artist.
The Ninth Circuit’s categorization of digital music downloads
from third party online retailers as licenses should be followed by the
courts. It is unlikely that, under the original contract, the parties
intended for digital music downloads to be Records sold. One reason for
this conjecture is because record labels do not want the music
downloads to be considered sales, as this invokes the first-sale doctrine.
The labels’ are reluctant to allow users to resell the music in accordance
with the first-sale doctrine; instead, the labels prefer to retain their
control over the music.228 Additionally, it is obvious that artists did not
intend for digital downloads to be considered sales because this would
decrease their royalty rate.229 Therefore, when interpreting the contracts
and looking to the intention of the parties, it is evident that the parties
225
226
227
228
229

See ReDigi, 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
See supra Part II.B.2
See supra Part II.A.2
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Introduction.
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would not have originally intended for digital music downloads to be
considered Records sold.
CONCLUSION
Record labels were ill-prepared under their longstanding contracts
to transition to a new mainstream distribution system that relied heavily
on licensing because of the higher royalty payments given to artists
under the traditional licensing model.230 Wanting to preserve their
business model, record labels interpreted digital downloads as sales,
rather than licenses, in order to retain profits.231 Unfortunately, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York agrees with this
interpretation. However, the court’s reasoning causes disaccord with
copyright law, specifically because of the court’s refusal to assent to a
digital first-sale doctrine. Further the court’s ruling in Malmsteen
disassociates digital music distribution usage terms with the nearly
identical licensing terms found in software and e-book agreements.
The Ninth Circuit’s classification of these transactions as licenses
accords with the new music distribution model that has severely
reduced the manufacturing and distribution costs previously incurred by
labels. The court correctly recognized that a license was formed
between users and online music retailers, because the terms did no
conform with the necessary principles associated with a sale. This ruling
created unity between the licensing terms of software, e-book, and
digital music downloading platforms. The Ninth Circuit ruling also
comports with courts’ failure to recognize a digital first-sale doctrine.
For these reasons, courts should use the Ninth Circuit’s ruling as
guidance in determining artists’ royalty rates for downloads of music.
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Id.
Id.

